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Abstract
International investment between countries is aimed at improving economic development
of the state parties and its integration to the world economy. To attract foreign investors, the
Government of Indonesia provides investment guarantees through BITs and domestic investment
laws. However, in its implementation, those guarantees brought several disputes between
Indonesian government and its foreign investors. Moreover, the BIT also shows an imbalance
in the position between Indonesia as the host country and its foreign investors which affects
the host state’s sovereignty. Reforms must be carried out in this area of law to strike a balance
between the protection of foreign investors and the sovereignty of the host state. In addition,
reforms in BIT must also be able to provide an equilibrium between economic improvement,
human rights, and environmental sustainability. This article describes the participation of the
Indonesian government in international investment law and the reforms that must be undertaken
in the field of investment law, both at the domestic and international levels.
Keywords : bilateral investment treaty, international investment law, investor-state dispute
settlement
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I. INTRODUCTION
Foreign investment plays significant role in the interactions between state
and non-state actors for their economies. By foreign investment, host states
can boost their economic development and foreign investors can gain financial
benefit from their investments. Foreign investment involves the transfer of
tangible or intangible assets from one country to another for the purpose of
their use in that country to generate wealth under the total or partial control
of the owner of the assets.1 Under foreign investment law, foreign investors
can invest in the host state’s projects, which usually in the vital infrastructure
projects of the country.
Indonesia, the largest country in Southeast Asia, is rich in natural resources.
It is the world’s biggest exporter of mining products, the leading producer
Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, The International Law of Foreign Investment, Fourth Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 8.
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and exporter of palm oil, the second-largest producer of rubber, coffee and
fisheries products, and the holder of 40% of the world’s geothermal energy
reserves.2 Given these conditions, it is important for Indonesia to open itself
to foreign investment since greater integration with the world economy can
further increase investment opportunities in the country.3
However, the openness of the Indonesian government to foreign
investment through BIT and domestic legislation has given rise to investment
disputes and sovereignty issues. This is because the guarantee for foreign
investors embedded in the BIT does not bring about an equal position among
the state parties, which in turn raises the issue of state sovereignty. The
Indonesian government itself has also faced investment disputes since the first
foreign investment law was enacted in 1958 because the regulation does not
provide basic protection for foreign investment. The Indonesian government
then changed its investment law in 2007 by adding some basic principles of
international investment protection and still facing investment disputes but
with different results. Despite having amended its investment law in 2007, the
Indonesian government still needs to reform its international investment law
as the world of international investment has changed to pay more attention to
current issues such as transparency and the protection of environmental and
human rights.
These problems lead into the main research question on how Indonesian
government’s participation in international investment law and how it should
be reformed. In order to answer the research question, this article provide a
legal analysis of the Indonesian government’s participation in the international
investment law, especially with regard to BITs and international investment
arbitration. Moreover, it also examines the types of international investment
law reforms that Indonesia can enact in its domestic legal system and in the
international community.

II. THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT’S PARTICIPATION
IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
A. INDONESIA’S BIT IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW
After achieving independence in 1945, Indonesia began its participation
in international investment by establishing a set of foreign investment
Richard Dutu, “Making the Most of Natural Resources in Indonesia,” OECD Economics Department
Working Papers No. 1236 (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2015), 7.
3
Gonzalo J. Varela, Policy Note 1: Openness, Growth, and Productivity in Indonesia’s Development Agenda (The World Bank, 2015), 9.
2
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regulations, the first being is Foreign Investment Law Number 78 Year 1958.
Under this regulation, foreign investors received several incentives, such as
land rights, tax relief, and guarantees against expropriation for investments in
vital domestic sectors such as transportation, telecommunication, electricity,
irrigation, weapons manufacturing, and atomic energy.4 This law was revoked
in 1966 due to regime change and continued in the following year by the
enactment of the Foreign Investment Law Number 1 Year 1967. This law was
later revoked through Foreign Investment Law Number 25 Year 2007 and
amended in 2020 through the Job Creation Law Number 11 Year 2020. The
government also established the Domestic Investment Law Number 6 of 1968,
which was amended through Domestic Investment Law Number 12 of 1970,
as a complementary regulation. Through these regulations, the Indonesian
government hoped to attract more foreign investors to invest in Indonesia.
In addition to new laws, the Indonesian government has established
BITs with the home countries of foreign investors. BIT is an important legal
document for foreign investor and the host state as it provides guarantees for
investments from one contracting state to the other.5 Most BITs also contain
dispute settlement clause which grants foreign investors direct access to
international arbitral tribunal to settle disputes with the host state relating to
obligations of the host state specified in the investment treaty.6
There is a total of 2,895 BIT’s globally, of which 2,335 are in force.7
Since its first enactment of foreign investment law in 1958, the Indonesian
government has established 72 BITs with countries around the world: 30 BITs
have been terminated, 26 BITs are currently in force, and 16 BITs have been
signed but are not yet in force:8
Continent

States

Asia

Algeria, Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, India, Iran, Jordan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Singapore, Sri Lanka, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,
Vietnam, Yemen

Indonesia. Undang-Undang tentang Penanaman Modal Asing, UU No. 78 Tahun 1958. (Law on the
Foreign Investment Law, Law No. 78 Year 1958), art. 3 and 6-13.
5
Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law, Second Edition (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 13.
6
Eric de Brabandere, Investment Treaty Arbitration as Public International Law: Procedural Aspects and
Implications (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 26.
7
UNCTAD, “International Investment Agreements Navigator,” UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub, accessed 24 January 2020, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements.
8
UNCTAD, “International Investment Agreements Navigator: Indonesia,” UNCTAD Investment Policy
Hub, accessed 24 January 2020, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/
countries/97/indonesia.
4
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Europe

Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary,
Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom

Africa

Egypt, Libya, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Sudan, Suriname, Tunisia,
Zimbabwe

America

Argentina, Chile, Cuba, Guyana, Jamaica, Venezuela

Oceania

Australia

As in any other BIT, provisions in BITs between Indonesian government
and the home state of foreign investors revolve around most-favourednation treatment, fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security,
expropriation, and dispute settlement mechanism. With regards to dispute
settlement mechanism, in its BITs, the settlement of investment disputes with
foreign investors can be conducted through an investment treaty arbitration
tribunal without resorting to Indonesian domestic courts beforehand. That
dispute settlement mechanism is important because it provides a more
independent arbitral tribunal to resolve investment disputes and to create
trust in foreign investors that Indonesian government applies an international
standard of dispute settlement mechanism in international investment.

B. INDONESIA’S PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
Based on data from UNCTAD, there were seven cases involving
Indonesia as the respondent in international investment treaty arbitration, with
most arbitrated under ICSID and UNCITRAL.9 They are summarized in the
following table.

9

No.

Case

Year

Result

1

Cemex Asia Holdings Ltd. v. ICSID
the Republic of Indonesia

Arbitration

2007

Settled

2

Rafat Ali Rizvi v. the Republic ICSID
of Indonesia

2011

Decided in favor of state

3

Hesham Talaat M. Al-Warraq UNCITRAL
v. the Republic of Indonesia

2011

Decided in favour of neither party (liability found
but no damages awarded)

4

Churchill Mining PLC and ICSID
Planet Mining Pty Ltd. v. the
Republic of Indonesia

2012

Decided in favour of
state

“Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator: Indonesia.”
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5

Nusa Tenggara Partnership UNCITRAL
B.V. and PT Newmont Nusa
Tenggara v. the Republic of
Indonesia

2014

Discontinued

6

Indian Metals & Ferro Alloys PCA
Ltd. v. the Republic of Indonesia

2015

Decided in favour of
state

7

Oleovest Pte. Ltd v. the Re- ICSID
public of Indonesia

2016

Discontinued

However, these data are different from those of the IICB. According to the
latter, there were twelves cases involving Indonesia as the respondent in the
international investment arbitration tribunal:10
Case

Arbitration

Year

Result

1

No.

Amco Asia Corporation and
others v. the Republic of
Indonesia

ICSID

1990

Decided in favor of
investor

2

Himpurna California Energy
Ltd. v PT. Perusahaan Listrik
Negara (Indonesia’s SOE)

UNCITRAL

1999

Decided in favor of
investor

3

Patuha Power Ltd. v PT.
Perusahaan Listrik Negara
(Indonesia’s SOE)

UNCITRAL

1999

Decided in favor of
investor

4

Karaha Bodas Company LLC.
v. PT. Pertamina and PT.
Perusahaan Listrik Negara
(Indonesia’s SOE)

UNCITRAL

2000

Decided in favor of
investor

5

Cemex Asia Holdings Ltd. v. the
Republic of Indonesia

ICSID

2007

Settled
(Indonesia
ordered to pay USD 337
million in compensation)

6

Nusa Tenggara Partnership
B.V. and PT Newmont Nusa
Tenggara v. the Republic of
Indonesia

UNCITRAL

2009

Discontinued

7

PT. Kaltim Prima Coal and
others v. Government of the
Province of East Kalimantan

ICSID

2009

Discontinued

8

Rafat Ali Rizvi v. the Republic of
Indonesia

ICSID

2011

Decided in favor of state

10

Fritz Horas Silalahi, Indonesia Arbitration Update (IICB 2016).
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No.

Case

Arbitration

Year

Result

9

Hesham Talaat M. Al-Warraq v.
the Republic of Indonesia

UNCITRAL

2011

Decided in favor of state

10

Churchill Mining PLC and
Planet Mining Pty Ltd. v. the
Republic of Indonesia

ICSID

2012

Decided in favor of state

11

Indian Metals & Ferro Alloys
Ltd. v. the Republic of Indonesia

UNCITRAL

2015

Decided in favor of state

Oleovest Pte. Ltd v. the Republic
of Indonesia

ICSID

2016

Discontinued

Investment treaty arbitration involving the Indonesian government can
be separated into two categories: before and after the establishment of the
Foreign Investment Law Number 25 Year 2007 since it brings a reform in
Indonesian foreign investment policy by providing fundamental protections
in international investment law.
1. INDONESIA’S INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION BEFORE
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW NUMBER
25 YEAR 2007
Before the establishment of Foreign Investment Law Number 25
Year 2007, there were four cases involving the Indonesian government in
investment treaty arbitration: Himpurna California Energy Ltd. and Patuha
Power Ltd. v. PT. Perusahaan Listrik Negara, Karaha Bodas Company LLC
v. PT. Perusahaan Listrik Negara and PT. Pertamina, Government of the
Province of East Kalimantan v. PT. Kaltim Prima Coal, and the Republic of
Indonesia v. Amco Asia Corporation.
a.

HIMPURNA CALIFORNIA ENERGY LTD. AND PATUHA POWER
LTD. V. PT. PERUSAHAAN LISTRIK NEGARA

The case was about two energy sales contracts that entitled Himpurna
California Energy Ltd. and Patuha Power Ltd. (claimant) to establish a
geothermal power plant in the Patuha and Dieng regions of Indonesia and
sell the power they produced to PT. Perusahaan Listrik Negara (respondent),
an Indonesian SOE.11 The project contracts were specifically allocated to the
Indonesian side the risks arising from force majeure, such as actions or failures
to act by any Indonesian government instrumentality without justifiable
reasons and compliance with Indonesian legal requirements.12
Irina Petrova, “Stepping on the Shoulders of a Drowning Man the Doctrine of Abuse of Right as a Tool
for Reducing Damages for Lost Profits: Troubling Lessons from the Patuha and Himpurna Arbitrations,”
Georgetown Journal of International Law 35, no. 2 (2004): 456.
12
Andrea Saldarriaga and Mark Kantor, “Damages in International Commercial Arbitration: Methods of
11
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When the Indonesian economy experienced severe impacts associated
with the 1997-1998 economic crisis, the president issues a decree in 1998
which ordered the government to review, postpone, and shut down several
infrastructure projects. As a result, the respondent refused to buy electricity
from the claimant.13 In response, the claimant commenced arbitration
proceedings to recover the contract. The arbitral tribunal found that the
respondent had breached the contract and duties of good faith by failing to
provide guarantees that it would fulfil its obligations and by preventing the
companies from completing the development of the power plant facilities
to the contractually stipulated capacity. The tribunal awarded the project
companies a total of USD 572 million in damages.14 The tribunal also found
that, by failing to provide assurances to the project companies, the respondent
had breached its duty to perform its contractual obligations in good faith.15
The violation of good faith obligations by the host state’s government
is crucial and can lead to distrust from foreign investors. This is because
the violation of good faith is essentially a violation of the BIT itself, as the
good faith principle is embedded in the BIT’s provision of fair and equitable
treatment. This provision requires the contracting parties to treat international
investments in a manner that does not affect the basic expectations considered
by the foreign investor to make the investment.16
b.

KARAHA BODAS COMPANY LLC V. PT. PERUSAHAAN LISTRIK
NEGARA AND PT. PERTAMINA

In November 1994, Karaha Bodas Company LLC (claimant) signed a
joint operation contract with PT. Pertamina that granted them with geothermal
development rights in West Java, Indonesia. The company also signed
an energy sales contract with PT. Perusahaan Listrik Negara in which PT.
Perusahaan Listrik Negara agreed to purchase the electrical energy produced
by PT. Pertamina at the Karaha Bodas geothermal facility.17 In January 1998,
the president of Indonesia issued a decree to terminate the project. As a result,
both the respondents did not wish to continue their cooperation with the
claimant. In response, the latter brought the dispute to an arbitration tribunal
in Switzerland under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.18 In the final award,
Calculation,” in Contemporary Issues in International Arbitration and Mediation: The Fordham Papers,
Arthur W. Rovine (Brill Nijhoff, 2010), 224.
13
Petrova, “Troubling Lessons from the Patuha and Himpurna Arbitrations,” 456.
14
Ibid, 460.
15
Ibid.
16
Dolzer and Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law, 143.
17
Sujayadi, “Interaction between the Setting Aside of an Award and Leave for Enforcement,” Yuridika 30,
no. 2 (2015): 335.
18
Ibid.
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the tribunal held that the respondent breached the contract with the claimant
and awarded the company USD 261 million in damages, including USD 111
million in sunk costs, USD 150 million in lost profits, and 4% post-judgment
interest. The claimant initiated legal proceedings to enforce the arbitral award
in the United States, Hong Kong, Canada, and Singapore (the countries in
which assets of the respondents were located) under Article V of the New
York Convention 1958.19 However, PT. Pertamina attempted to annul the
arbitral award through the District Court of Central Jakarta.20 In August 2002,
the latter set aside the arbitral award in its judgement.
This case brought adverse international attention to the investment
conditions in Indonesia since it demonstrated that Indonesian judges
could interpret the law in a manner that eliminates legitimate international
awards.21 However, the Indonesian courts were not the appropriate forum
for overriding the Switzerland arbitral award in the Karaha Bodas case; the
parties had agreed that the arbitration tribunal would be in Geneva, and there
was no sufficient evidence that the Indonesian civil procedure applied to the
arbitration process.22 Moreover, there was no arbitration principle or practice
to support PT. Pertamina’s argument that the Indonesian courts had primary
jurisdiction over the award.23 Under the 1958 New York Convention, the
Indonesian courts have jurisdiction to enforce or refuse to enforce the award
in Indonesian territory but not to set aside the award from the arbitral tribunal.
c.

GOVERNMENT OF THE PROVINCE OF EAST KALIMANTAN V.
PT. KALTIM PRIMA COAL

This is a dispute regarding unpaid dividends. Based on the contract,
the government of East Kalimantan, a province under administration of the
Republic of Indonesia (claimant) had 51% shares in PT. Kaltim Prima Coal
(respondent).24 This meant that the respondent owed a dividend of USD
144.18 billion (based on the company’s profits from 2001 to 2010) to the
claimant.25 However, the respondent failed to carry out its obligations and the
claimant brought the case to ICSID. In its award, the tribunal stated that the
requirements for the jurisdiction of arbitration established by Article 25 of the
ICSID Convention were not met, which meant that the tribunal did not have
Sujayadi, “Interaction between the Setting Aside,” 336.
Ibid.
21
Noah Rubin, “The Enforcement and Annulment of International Arbitration Awards in Indonesia,” American University International Law Review 20 no. 2 (2005): 398.
22
Ibid., 348.
23
Ibid., 349.
24
The Government of the Province of East Kalimantan v PT Kaltim Prima Coal, Rio Tinto PLC, BP P.L.C.,
Pacific Resources Investment Limited, BP International Limited, Sangatta Holdings Limited, Kalimantan
Coal Limited, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/3, Award on Jurisdiction, 28 December 2009, para 18.
25
Ibid.
19
20
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jurisdiction over the dispute.26 Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention states
that ‘the jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising
directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or any constituent
subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designated to the Centre by
that state) and a national of another Contracting State.’ In its conclusion, the
tribunal stated that only the government of Indonesia could validly consent to
ICSID arbitration on behalf of the Republic of Indonesia. However, there was
no authorisation from the Indonesian government to the government of East
Kalimantan to represent in the case, and the state of Indonesia had not validly
designated the government of East Kalimantan as a constituent subdivision.27
Therefore, the claimant could not be held to have a right to represent the
Republic of Indonesia before an ICSID tribunal.28
d.

THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA V. AMCO ASIA CORPORATION

Amco Asia Corporation (claimant) had invested in a hotel in Indonesia
with PT. Wisma as its local partner. According to the contract, PT. Wisma had
a right to lease and manage the hotel. However, they ultimately assisted the
Indonesian armed force in taking over Amco’s property. Though the armed
forces of the host state were involved in the acquisition of a foreign investor’s
property, the tribunal stated that there was no attributability to the Indonesian
government, as the army acted in its private business.29 However, the tribunal
found the Indonesian government was in breach of international law since
they failed to protect investors from the expropriation of foreign property by
their people. In its award, the tribunal stated, ‘It is a generally accepted rule
of international law, clearly stated in international awards and judgments and
generally accepted in the literature, that a state has a duty to protect aliens and
their investment against unlawful acts committed by some of its citizens’.30
A similar issue also occurred in Wena Hotels v. Egypt, where agents of an
Egyptian company that affiliated with the Egyptian government forcibly took
control of a foreign investment. Though the actors who took over the foreign
investor’s property had an affiliation with the government of the host state, the
tribunal preferred to base its decision on the Egyptian government’s failure to
protect the investment of its foreign investor.31
2. INDONESIA’S INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AFTER THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW NUMBER 25
Ibid., para 53.
Ibid., 185 and 200.
28
Ibid.
29
See Sornarajah, The International Law of Foreign Investment, 405.
30
See Amco Asia Corporation and Others v The Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1 Awards
on Jurisdiction, 21 November 1984, para 172.
31
See Dolzer and Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law, 226-227.
26
27
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YEAR 2007
Based on the data from UNCTAD, the Indonesian government was
involved in seven cases in the ISDS after the establishment of the Foreign
Investment Law Number 25 Year 2007 in which Indonesia was the respondent
in all of those cases: Cemex Asia Holdings Ltd. v. the Republic of Indonesia,
Rafat Ali Rizvi v. the Republic of Indonesia, Hesham Talaat M. Al-Warraq
v. the Republic of Indonesia, Churchill Mining PLC and Planet Mining Pty
Ltd. v. the Republic of Indonesia, Nusa Tenggara Partnership B.V. and PT
Newmont Nusa Tenggara v. the Republic of Indonesia, Indian Metals & Ferro
Alloys Ltd. v. the Republic of Indonesia, and Oleovest Pte. Ltd v. the Republic
of Indonesia.32
a.

RAFAT ALI RIZVI V. THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

Rafat Ali Rizvi (claimant) is a foreign investor who invested in Bank
Century in Indonesia through Chinkara Capital Limited. On November 2008,
Bank Century nearly collapsed, and the Indonesian government stated that
this could cause a systemic impact to the country’s economy. In response, the
Indonesian government provided a bail-out to Bank Century. As the majority
shareholder in Bank Century, the claimant felt aggrieved by the government’s
actions and sued them to ICSID. The claimant argued that his investment fell
under Article 2(1) of the 1976 UK-Indonesia BIT and Articles 1 and 5 of
the Indonesia Foreign Investment Law Number 1 Year 1967 and therefore
had to be protected under both the BIT and Indonesian law.33 For this reason,
the claimant argued that the respondent violated the most-favored-nation
provision by presenting a bail-out to Bank Century, which violated Indonesia’s
obligation under Article 2(1) and Article 4(1) of the 1976 UK-Indonesia BIT.
In its award, the tribunal stated that the purpose of the investment must not only
be included in the definition of investment as regulated by Article 1 of the 1976
UK-Indonesia BIT, but it must also comply with Article 2(1) of the BIT.34 The
article stipulates that permission for investments made by foreign investors
must be obtained from IICB under Foreign Investment Law Number 1 Year
1967. As the claimant’s investment was not recognised under the Indonesia
Foreign Investment Law as required in Article 2(1) of the BIT, then it did not
fall within the scope of the agreement, and therefore, not considered as a direct
investment.35 In his separate concurring opinion, Professor Sornarajah stated
that the indirect investment made by the claimant through Chinkara Ltd. was
UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub, “Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator: Indonesia.”
See Rafat Ali Rizvi v. the Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/13, Award on Jurisdiction, 16
July 2013, paras 52 and 109.
34
Ibid., paras 65-71.
35
Ibid., 74.
32
33
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not protected by the BIT since investments in Indonesia can only be made
through companies incorporated in the country.36 The tribunal also rejected
the claimant’s reliance on the most-favored-nation provision of the BIT as
inapplicable to the question of the BIT’s scope in the present case.37
b.

HESHAM TALAAT M. AL-WARRAQ V. THE REPUBLIC OF
INDONESIA

The circumstances of this case were similar to Rafat Ali Rizvi v. the Republic
of Indonesia in that the claimant made the same claim: the bail-out action by
the Indonesian government to Bank Century was a violation of the investor’s
fundamental rights of fair trial under Article 10 of the OIC Agreement and
fair and equitable treatment and protection and security under Article 10(1)
of the OIC Agreement. In its award, the UNCITRAL arbitral tribunal decided
the case in favour of neither party (liability was found, but no damage was
awarded). The tribunal found that the claimant’s indirect shareholding in Bank
Century meant that he was considered an investor, as indirect shareholding
still fell within the meaning of Article 1 of OIC Agreement, in which the
definition of ‘capital’ and ‘investment’ refers broadly to ‘all assets’.38 The
tribunal also rejected the claimant’s claim that the respondent violated his
rights under Article 10 OIC Agreement since the meaning of basic rights in
Article 10 is relative to the basic property rights of the investor, not their rights
relative to fair trial.39 Moreover, the tribunal upheld the claimant’s claim of the
violation of fair and equitable treatment because the Indonesian government
tried and convicted him without proper notification of the criminal charges
and sentences.40 Though the respondent violated the claimant’s due process
rights, the tribunal stated that they did not violate the protection and security
standard under Article 2 of OIC agreement; the violation of due process rights
did not have any adverse impact on the claimant’s investment, as the bail-out
had already been concluded by the time that the Indonesian authorities had
conducted their investigation and prosecution of the claimant.41
The tribunal’s decision, which stated that the respondent had violated the
claimant’s due process rights by trying and convicting him without proper
notification of the criminal charges and sentences, was not an appropriate
decision. First, there was no fair and equitable treatment guarantee in the
Rafat Ali Rizvi v. the Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/13, Separate Concurring Opinion
of Professor Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, paras 31-32.
37
Ibid., 74.
38
Hesham Talaat M. Al-Warraq v. the Republic of Indonesia, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 15 December
2004, paras. 516 – 517.
39
Ibid., paras 521-523.
40
Ibid., para 621.
41
Ibid., paras 629-630.
36
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OIC Agreement.42 The tribunal concluded that the claimant was entitled to
fair and equitable treatment protection through the OIC Agreement’s mostfavored-nation clause, because many BITs that Indonesia was a party to
mentioned fair and equitable treatment.43 This reasoning is incorrect, because
BITs can vary in content according to the speciﬁc needs of the negotiating
states44 and the contracting parties within the OIC Agreement have their own
rights to determine the provision of the investment agreement. Secondly, a
proceeding in absentia is allowed under Article 14(3)(d) of the ICCPR only if
the accused person, when informed of the proceedings sufficiently in advance,
voluntarily declines to exercise their right to be present.45 The claimant stated
that the police had never investigated him nor his attorney in Indonesia and
that the Indonesian government did not take reasonable steps to ensure that
he was informed in a timely manner of the criminal investigation that was
being carried out against him. Furthermore, the claimant said that, though
the Indonesian government was well aware of his presence in Saudi Arabia,
they failed to seek the assistance of the Saudi Arabia authorities to interrogate
him or even allow investigators from Indonesian government to travel to
Riyadh to hear the claimant and take statements from him.46 However, on 29
October 2009, the respondent submitted a request to the government of Saudi
Arabia which mentioned that ‘should the Government of Saudi Arabia is
unable to grant the request for extradition, the Government of the Republic of
Indonesia seeks the assistance of the Government of Saudi Arabia to carry out
investigations and prosecute Hesham Talaat Al Warraq under Article 16(10)
UNTOC’.47 Moreover, on Orders dated 23 May 2010 and 4 June 2010, the
Jakarta Central Court had by interlocutory judgment declared the summons to
have been duly served on the claimant.48 In light of these facts, the tribunal’s
view that the respondent failed to establish that it made any efforts to verify
that the claimant received any of the summonses allegedly sent to him49, that
it did not attempt to serve the court summonses to the claimant via letters
rogatory, and that it failed to use reasonably available mechanism (i.e., its
embassies in Singapore and Saudi Arabia and requesting to Interpol to issue
a Blue Notice) to verify which of the claimant’s addresses was his place of
residence50 is cannot be accepted.
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

Ibid., para 540.
Ibid., paras 554-555.
De Brabandere, Investment Treaty Arbitration as Public International Law, 25.
Ibid., paras 564-565.
Ibid., para 581.
Ibid., para 593.
Ibid., para 588.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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A similar understanding of BIT provisions between the contracting parties
is essential. In Rafat Ali Rizvi v. the Republic of Indonesia and Hesham Talaat
M. Al-Warraq v. the Republic of Indonesia, the claims were about dispute
regarding definition of ‘investment’ in the BIT. The different meanings
amongst BITs are normal since BITs are vary in content according to the
speciﬁc needs of the negotiating states.51 That is why it is important to use
the travaux préparatoires of the BIT. Travaux préparatoires is a law drafts or
records of discussions relating to legislation or a treaty under consideration.52
Based on Article 32 of the VCLT, travaux préparatoires can be used as a
supplementary means of interpretation and are important for conforming the
meaning of a provision.53 Courts and tribunals that interpret treaties regularly
review the travaux préparatoires whenever they are brought to their attention.54
For example, in Government of the Province of East Kalimantan v. PT.
Kaltim Prima Coal, the tribunal used travaux préparatoires to establish facts
about state’s consent to the BIT.55 However, the negotiating history of BITs
is typically poorly documented.56 This can cause difficulties for contracting
parties when a disagreement arises about BIT provisions, which can further
escalate a dispute. However, if detailed travaux préparatoires are available,
the contracting parties can refer to them to determine the meaning of original
terms or to find a middle ground in the disagreement.
c.

CHURCHILL MINING PLC AND PLANET MINING PTY LTD. V.
THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

In this case, Churchill Mining PLC and Planet Mining Pty Ltd (claimants)
argued that the revocation of their permission in the East Kutai Coal Project by
the Government of East Kalimantan on behalf of the government of Indonesia
(respondent) amounted to indirect expropriation, violation of fair and equitable
treatment, and violation of arbitrary, unreasonable and/or discriminatory
measures. The claimants argued that the Indonesian government violated
Article 3(2) and Article 5(1) of the 1976 UK-Indonesia BIT. The respondent
stated that the tribunal should dismissed all claims brought by the claimants
since their claims were based on forged documents,57 they were not good
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faith investors, and did not exercise ‘a reasonable level of due diligence in
investigating the forgery of the impugned licenses’.58 By contrast, the claimants
replied that a finding of forgery would not be dismissive of the entire case, that
the effect of a finding of forgery on the validity of the exploitation licenses
would still need to be determined, and that a failure to investigate third-party
wrongdoing did not automatically deprive an investor of treaty protection.59 In
its award, the ICSID tribunal decided in favor of the respondent and held that
all claims were inadmissible since they were based on forged documents and
the claimants’ lack of diligence in carrying out their investment.60 The tribunal
also decided that the claimants should bear all the costs associated with the
proceedings since they persisted in asserting claims based on ‘obviously
forged documents’, without making a ‘genuine effort’ to discover the truth as
well as mischaracterizing relevant evidence.61
Based on this case, it is important to note that the contracting parties
must make cooperation of investment based on good faith principle. The
obligation to act in good faith include the obligation not to inﬂict damage
upon an investment purposefully.62 The good faith principle also applies
when the contracting parties decide to solve a dispute through the arbitral
tribunal. In this case, by using forged evidence to confirm their claims, the
claimants demonstrated that they were not good faith investors and did not
exercise ‘a reasonable level of due diligence in investigating the forgery of the
impugned licenses’, nor did they behave like ‘reasonably prudent investors in
the circumstances’.63 The tribunal’s decision to hold all claims as inadmissible
is acceptable as they arose from rights based on fraud and forged evidence.
This consideration also applies in the Metal Tech v. Uzbekistan case, when
the ICSID tribunal found that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the claims from the
claimant due to corruption in the Metal-Tech’s investment in Uzbekistan.64
d.

INDIAN METALS AND FERRO ALLOYS LTD. V. THE REPUBLIC
OF INDONESIA

The claimant’s claim is about the violation if non-expropriation and
fair and equitable treatment committed by the Indonesian government. The
claimant argued that the respondent is unable to clear out the claimant’s
mining overlapping concession permission and put it on the government’s
Clean and Clear list (list of non-overlapping mining concession), did not
58
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inform the claimant about the process being followed for issuance of the Clean
and Clear list, nor give any reason for non-inclusion of claimant’s investment
from the Clean and Clear list, while the respondent let other companies’
overlapping concession permissions to be solved and put it on the Clean and
Clear list.65 In response to the claimant’s accusation concerning the violation
of fair and equitable treatment, the respondent argued that the Claimant did
not conduct proper due diligence. The claimant should consider at the first
place that there is a risk of overlapping mining license in Indonesia, which
means that the claimant should make a proper legal due diligence before
making its investment.66 The Indonesian government have tried to solve the
overlapping license issue by solving each case in a ‘first come first served’
basis and the claimant did not file any evidence to support its assertion that
its license should be preferred because of ‘first come first served’ nor file any
evidence that its investment should be in the Clean and Clear list.67 In its
award, the Tribunal did not find any merit in any of the claimant’s complain.68
In their judgement, the Tribunal was on the opinion that, firstly, the respondent
is not bound by international law to reconcile its internal boundaries dispute
or overlapping internal licenses.69 Secondly, there is no legal obligation in
Indonesian domestic legislation which guarantees or warrants any timeframe
within which overlapping boundaries are to be resolved.70 The Tribunal also
cannot find any violation of the fair and equitable treatment standard in the
application of ‘first come first served’ basis by the respondent in resolving the
overlapping mining licenses.71 Lastly, the Tribunal did not find any evidence
of de jure and de facto discrimination against the claimant.72
It is crucial for foreign investors to aware of any risks of their investment
in the host state and must do a proper due diligence beforehand. The BIT
between the host state and the home state of the foreign investor also cannot
be treated as insurance policy for their investment. It is because the host
state cannot give a guarantee that it can solve its internal investment issue
immediately, which means that the investor must manage its own risk. The
fair and equitable treatment can be understood as embodying the rule of law
as a standard that the legal systems of host states have to embrace in their
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treatment of foreign investors.73 The host state will not violate the fair and
equitable treatment principle just because it unable to solve its internal legal
problem concerning foreign investment as long as the effect of that failure
also applies to other investors and the host state government did not act
discriminatively. Moreover, the claimant also needs to provide firm evidence
for its claim that the respondent has violated the fair and equitable treatment
since the burden of proof of that claim is on the side of the claimant.
No information about awards is available in Cemex Asia Holdings Ltd.
v. the Republic of Indonesia and Nusa Tenggara Partnership B.V., and PT.
Newmont Nusa Tenggara v. the Republic of Indonesia since the cases were
not made public. By consequence, they cannot be further analyzed.

III. THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT’S PARTICIPATION
IN THE CURRENT REFORM ON INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW
A. CURRENT REFORM ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW
1. Issues of BITs
a. INEQUAL POSITION OF BIT
When conducting a BIT, the host state and the home state of foreign
investors would negotiate about kinds of protections that the host state can
provide for the foreign investors. However, at the same time, the BIT’s
permits the home state to dictate the circumstances under which its investors
will be permitted to invest abroad, while leaving its investors in a legally
preferred position within the host state.74 This problem can be even worse
if the host state is a developing country. The host state may admit request of
extraordinary protections from the home state for its investors which may
risk economic, environmental, or human rights condition of the host state,
just because the host state needs investment from the home state. In due time,
the existing inequalities will cause the host state to take illiberal action in the
name of economic development, and, when developing states will not feel
the same compulsion to attract foreign investment, they may be tempted to
renege on their promise of investment security.75 This will be particularly true
if inward foreign investment does not appear to be contributing to economic
Stephan W. Schill, Fair and Equitable Treatment, the Rule of Law, and Comparative Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 151.
74
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development, either because it has failed to raise productivity sufficiently or
because it is exacerbating existing inequalities.76
b. ENVIRONMENTAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS PROVISION IN THE BIT
Currently, there is a global protest which alleges that investment
agreements only focus on economic development between the contracting
parties of the BIT instead of giving more concern to environmental and human
rights issues despite the fact that many environmental damages and human
rights violations resulted from the establishment of investment agreements.77
Even though investment agreements can boost economic development of
the host state, the investments can lead to adverse consequences for the host
state itself. For example, the investment treaties secure the export of highly
polluting industries into the developing world78 and human rights violations
committed by the parent companies of multinational corporations.79 Moreover,
studies by Non-Government Organizations have demonstrated that many
natural resource projects are initiated despite their adverse consequences on
human rights.80
Under international law, the protection of environment and human rights
are jus cogens. The ICJ and other international courts have recognized in
recent cases that the jus cogens norms reflect the fundamental or essential
values of international law.81 Article 53 of the VCLT states that ‘jus cogens
is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States
as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted.’ If a provision
in a treaty is in violation of jus cogens at the time of its conclusion, the
treaty as a whole would be void ab initio (devoid of all legal effect from the
outset).82 Considering the important position of jus cogens in international
law, which gives explicit responsibility to the contracting state not to violate
the environmental and human rights, the protection of these rights should be
accommodated in investment treaties.
2. Issues of ISDS
a. NATIONAL THREAT THROUGH ISDS
Provisions of investment treaty arbitration embedded in BIT has a purpose
to give protection of rights and other interests between the contracting
76
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parties. However, what investment arbitration really does is help developed
countries to regulate the activities of developing countries regarding foreign
investments.83

Number of investment arbitration claims filed per year, by development
status of investor’s home state84
The data above shows that the home state of the foreign investors is very
dominant in claiming ISDS against its contracting parties, while middleincome, lower-middle income, and low-income country only have a very
minimum number in claiming the investor-State dispute.

Percentage of claims won by host states (legal definition of success), out of
the claims that were filed against states of each economic development status
(high income=HI, upper-middle income=UMI, lower-middle income=LMI,
lower income=LI) and that were concluded, by year of filing (10-year moving
Thomas Schultz and Cedric Dupont, “Investment Arbitration: Promoting the Rule of Law or Overempowering Investors? A Quantitative Empirical Study,” European Journal of International Law 25, no. 4
(2015): 1151-1152, DOI:10.1093/ejil/chu075
84
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average)85
The data above shows that the high-income states have a higher success
rate of claims than the low-income states. Economic power disparities seem
to be a factor of success since the high-incomes states has a better rule of
law and better legal counsel it can afford.86 The dominance of high-income
states in filing claims and win the ISDS, and the provision of the foreign
investors protections in BIT can be seen as a practice of neo-colonialism since
the high-income states can control the developing countries through their
foreign investors and the system serves to maximize the protection of foreign
investors from developed countries.87 Developing states derive no benefit
from the system of protections devised through arbitration that they stand to
lose from multimillion-dollar arbitral awards resulting from the violation of
the treaties at times when they are least able to meet such awards.88
The practice of neo-colonialism can lead to a ‘regulatory chill’, where
the government of the host state cannot establish a legitimate regulatory
measure in the public’s interest due to fear of claims from foreign investors.
In practice, foreign investors have used ISDS to punish countries for limiting
investment proﬁts during economic crises (e.g. LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E
Capital Corp. and LG&E International Inv v. Argentina), reforming tax and
environmental regulations (e.g. S.D. Myers Inc. v. Canada), or prosecuting
executives accused of crimes.89 However, threat practices are usually difficult
to prove. A recent study for the Dutch government concluded that ‘It would
therefore be nearly impossible to find enough of these individual cases to
prove any overall pattern of regulatory chill’.90
2. TRANSPARENCY ISSUE IN ISDS
Parties of the dispute or the tribunal itself have the option not to publish
awards made by arbitration tribunals because there are rules concerning the
confidentiality of the award resulting from an investment dispute. Several
rules in the ICSID Convention or Arbitration Rules are intended to maintain
a certain degree of privacy in the conduct of the proceedings, because it is
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necessary to safeguard the fairness and efﬁciency of the proceedings.91 For
example, Article 48(5) of the ICSID Convention stipulates that ‘the Centre
shall not publish the award without the consent of the parties’. Moreover, Rule
6(2) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules mentions that the arbitrator should sign a
declaration that they will keep conﬁdential all information and the contents of
any award made by the tribunal. However, Article 3 of the UNCITRAL Rules
on Transparency differs from this, as most documents from arbitral proceedings
are made available to the public. The UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency
demonstrates a clear departure from the principle of conﬁdentiality with
regard to investment treaty arbitration.92
The investment treaty arbitration should be transparent and public because
foreign investors should have fully knowledge about the implementation of
investment agreements in the host state, the kinds of investment disputes
which occur in the host state, and the treatment of foreign investors by the
host state. Eric de Brabandere listed five reasons why international treaty
arbitration should be transparent and public: 1) Investment protection treaties
have broader objectives than the investment disputes settlement which means
that a BIT does not have the private and closed character of international
arbitration; 2) The public international law character of investment treaty
arbitration is not only about its private function, but also has a very important
public aspect, which exceeds private bilateral relations between the parties;
3) The State’s public reporting responsibilities may be applicable in the sense
that states may be bound by principles of open government expected of public
authorities; 4) The legitimacy of the arbitral process is essential in investment
treaty arbitration since public access to the outcome and conduct of the arbitral
process is important for inspiring conﬁdence in the arbitral mechanism;
5) The public availability of decisions enhances access to the reasoning of
arbitral tribunals and thus enables host states and foreign investors to be better
acquainted with the strengths and weaknesses of their case.93
The transparency of investment treaty arbitration has also been reﬂected
in recent BITs. For example, the 2012 US Model BIT provides that after
receiving the notice of intent, the notice of arbitration, pleadings, memorials
and briefs, the respondent should submit to the tribunal by a disputing party.
Moreover, the Canadian Model Foreign Investment Protection Agreement
stipulates that ‘all documents submitted to, or issued by, the Tribunal shall
be publicly available, unless the disputing parties otherwise agree, subject to
the deletion of conﬁdential information’ and that ‘any Tribunal award under
91
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this Section shall be publicly available, subject to the deletion of conﬁdential
information’.94
3. The Need of International Investment Law Reform
In the regime of international investment law, BIT and ISDS mechanism
is important because it offers foreign investors protection and mechanism to
hold states accountable for breaches of promises made in investment treaties.95
This transforms investment treaties from political declarations into readily
enforceable rules to stabilize investor-state relations.96 It also determines how
serious the government of the host state in protecting foreign investments
made by other states. In the past decades, an increasing number of investorstate arbitration cases have been initiated:
With the increasing number of investor-state arbitration cases used to
solve the disputes between foreign investors and the host state, it is necessary
to resolve the problems in international investment law: Inequality position
between the host states and the home state in the BIT and the practice of neocolonialism from high-income states to low-income states. When imbalances
occur as a result of a tilt that favors certain interests over others within a regime,
there is bound to be a reaction by those whose interests are affected.97 One of
the reactions is the withdrawal from the regime. On the part of some states,
there is an outright rejection of international investment law regime, either
through the threat of termination of treaties or withdrawal from the ICSID
Convention.98 This condition started when Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and
Venezuela stated intention to withdraw from ICSID Convention and terminate
several BITs.99 The impact of withdrawal or change on existing disputes is yet
to be assessed, but the more restrictive the views of the tribunals are on the
effect of these withdrawals, the greater would be the disenchantment with the
regime.100
The national threat issue is very sensitive since it involves state sovereignty.
When the law begins to affect the sovereignty of states, it will be put into
reversal.101 In order to solve this problem, there needs to be an obligation
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in ISDS for the foreign investors to make mediation or to local remedies
before resorting to international arbitration. ISDS also should preserve the
equal rights and obligations between the foreign investors and the host state.
Preserving greater regulatory space and unilateral commitments in legislation
and through contracts remain the alternatives that are realistic at present are
also needed to bring the contracting parties to return to a regime that permits
state sovereignty.102
Another increasing debate about the ISDS mechanism in terms of
issues with consistency and erroneous arbitral decisions (different legal
interpretations of similar treaty provisions and differences in the assessment
of the merits in cases involving the same facts), the position of arbitrators
(appointed arbitrators can be biased since they can be re-appointed in future
cases and their frequent ‘changing of hats’, or serving as arbitrators in some
cases and counsel in others), and the high cost and time-intensive nature of the
arbitrations.103 To solve these issues, the UNCTAD’s Investment Commission
and Expert Meetings released the World Investment Report in 2013 in which
member states agreed to enact reforms in five areas of ISDS:104
a) Promoting alternative dispute resolution
This approach proposes the non-binding methods such as conciliation
and mediation to save time and money, find mutually acceptable solutions,
prevent escalation of disputes, and preserve a workable relationship between
the disputing parties.105
b) Tailoring the existing system through individual investment agreement
Each country applies specific modifications to certain aspects of ISDS
system in their new investment agreement, such as setting time limits for
bringing claims, increasing the contracting parties’ role in interpreting the
treaty, or establishing a mechanism for consolidation of related claims.
c) Limiting investor access to ISDS
This option envisages narrowing down the range of situations in which
investors may resort to ISDS in numerous ways, such as by reducing the
subject-matter scope for ISDS claims, restricting the range of investors who
qualify for benefiting from the treaty, and introducing a requirement to exhaust
local remedies before resorting to international arbitration.106
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d) Introducing an appeals facility
An appeals facility implies a standing body with the competence to
undertake a substantive review of awards rendered by arbitral tribunals to
improve their consistency, correct erroneous decisions made by first-level
tribunals, and enhance the predictability of the law.107
e) Creating a standing international investment court
This option entails the replacement of the current system of ad hoc arbitral
tribunals with a new institutional structure and the appeals chamber, which
would consist of judges appointed or elected by states for a fixed term.108
Such reform is important to improve the ISDS mechanism in resolving
disputes between foreign investors and host states. However, implementation
can be difficult. For example, it is challenging to set up an international
investment court since it would need to be approved by a large number of
states. It also cannot guarantee the consistency of awards resulting from a
dispute since there would be numerous investment disputes that could be
litigated through the new mechanism of ISDS.

B. INDONESIA’S INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW REFORM
1. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF OMNIBUS LAW
The government of Indonesia has reformed its international investment
law by included fundamental guarantees in international investment in the
Foreign Investment Law Number 25 Year 2007. The Job Creation Law
Number 11 Year 2020 (also called “Omnibus Law”), which amended 76
overlapping government regulations, including the Foreign Investment Law
Number 25 Year 2007, made a bigger reform, such as simplify investment
licensing, ease foreign investment restrictions which provide more investment
sector for foreign investment (this was further regulated by the Presidential
Regulation No. 10 of 2021 regarding Investment Sectors), make the labor law
more flexible, and streamline corporate tax regulations.109
The Indonesia’s Omnibus Law has given a positive impact to its economy.
Based on the data from Indonesia Ministry of Finance, the foreign investment
in Indonesia (excluding investment in banking and the oil and gas sector)
jumped 19.6 percent year-on-year to Rp116.8 trillion (USD 8.06 billion) in
the second quarter of 2021, following a 14 percent increase in the previous
107
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period.110 Even though the growth of its foreign investment could be declined
due to the rising of COVID-19 cases and tighter restrictions on people’s
activities starting in July 2021 which likely to affect the foreign investment
figures for the third quarter of 2021, the Omnibus Law has played an important
part of the economic recovery strategy and significantly improve the foreign
investment in Indonesia.
However, the regulation is by no means comprehensive since there is
no provision regarding the transparency. The latter is important, because
the Indonesian government would be able to gain the confidence of foreign
investors if it provided up-to-date and reliable information about the condition
of foreign investment within the country.
2. REFORM IN BIT AND ARBITRATION LAW
In 2015, the Indonesian government initiated BIT reform by reviewing
and terminating its 64 BITs since those BITs are considered unsuitable with
Indonesia’s current development.111 The goal of the review was to strike a
balance between investor protections and national sovereignty, maintain its
policy space to implement its own development goals, fix ISDS provisions,
and review provisions in investment agreements that may potentially override
national legislation.112 Although the investment protections still applied
under survival clause of the BITs and the Indonesian government only seek
to renegotiate the investment treaties and not to terminate those treaties
permanently, the review and termination has raised concerns among current
and prospective foreign investors.
The BIT review was important since it focused on limiting the scope of
application for ISDS provisions and five issues: the definitions of investment,
national treatment, most-favored-nation treatment, fair and equitable
treatment, and indirect expropriation.113 Unfortunately, it was not very
comprehensive since it did not include the issue of environmental and human
rights protections in the review. It is crucial for the Indonesian government
to add such provisions in its BITs; as a developing country, most foreign
investments in Indonesia are in the mining and manufacturing sectors which
make Indonesia very vulnerable to environmental damage and human rights
violations.114
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The Indonesian government must also reform its arbitration law. This
is because the substances of the Indonesia arbitration law (Arbitration and
Alternative Dispute Resolution Law Number 30 Year 1999) do not follow
the general provisions of international arbitration under the 1985 UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (UN General Assembly
Resolution Number 40/72). This causes difficulties in the execution or
implementation of awards made by the Indonesian arbitral tribunal abroad.
In addition, the current Indonesian arbitration law does not clearly define
international arbitration awards; this is a problem when foreign investors want
to execute the latter in Indonesia.115 Based on Article 1(9) of the Indonesia
Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Resolution Law Number 30 Year 1999,
there are two international arbitration awards recognized by the Indonesian
government: 1) an arbitration decision made by an arbitration institution or an
individual arbitrator outside the jurisdiction of the Republic of Indonesia; 2)
the decision of an arbitration institution or individual arbitrator that accordance
with the legal provisions of the Republic of Indonesia. The second alternative
has a potential to create multiple interpretations since it does not clearly
state the scope of international arbitration awards.116 The act also does not
explicitly regulate aspects governing international arbitrations conducted in
Indonesia, which may result in unclear international arbitration awards made
in Indonesian arbitral tribunals and add to the reluctance of foreign investors
to settle investment disputes through Indonesian arbitration.117 This issue arose
in the dispute between PT. Lirik Petroleum (international corporation operated
in Indonesia) and PT. Pertamina (Indonesian SOE), in which PT. Pertamina
did not recognize the international arbitration award decided in Indonesia and
requested its annulment. PT. Pertamina argued that, since the arbitral tribunal
in this case was domestic (as the arbitration process and award took place
in Indonesia), the arbitral mechanism fell under Indonesian arbitration law.
According to Article 59(1) of Indonesia Arbitration Law Number 30 Year
1999, the arbitral award must be registered with a district court within 30 days
of its pronouncement; however, because the arbitration award was registered
54 days after it was determined, it was considered invalid based on Indonesian
arbitration law.118 The Jakarta District Court and the Indonesia Supreme Court,
in its award, rejected the annulment request from PT. Pertamina since the
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contracting parties agreed to resolve their dispute in an Indonesian arbitral
tribunal under the rule of the International Chamber of Commerce, which
recognized the award as being from an international arbitral tribunal.119

IV. CONCLUSION
Foreign investment is essential for Indonesia as host state to increase its
economy. In order to attract foreign investors, the Indonesian government
must provide investment guarantees in its BITs and national regulations.
Since their first establishment of foreign investment regulation in 1958, the
Indonesian government has faced several foreign investment cases that were
litigated under ICSID and UNCITRAL. Most cases involved Indonesia as the
respondent, in which it was accused of violating fair and equitable treatment,
protection and security, and illegal expropriation. After being found guilty
in some arbitral cases, the Indonesian government amended its foreign
investment policy by establishing Foreign Investment Law Number 25 Year
2007. The new law included fundamental investment protections that were not
addressed in the previous regulations, such as full protection and security, fair
and equitable treatment, most-favoured-nation treatment, non-expropriation,
and a dispute settlement mechanism.
Currently, there is an international issue regarding international investment
law reform. Many global protests said that there should be an equal position
of BIT between the contracting states and provide greater consideration to
environment and human rights issues. The practice of ISDS must also be
reformed since it is frequently used by foreign investors to threaten the host
state. Moreover, ISDS must also be more transparent since foreign investors
have a right to know how host states treat foreign investments. It is also very
important for the ISDS to be more efficient in litigating international treaty
arbitration in order to enable arbitration cases to conclude more rapidly and at
lower expense.
Despite improvements, the Indonesian government must further reform its
international investment law. The latest Indonesia Foreign Investment Law does
not give any provisions regarding transparency in investment treaty arbitration.
It is important for the Indonesian government to add such provisions since it is
essential for foreign investors to be appraised of any investment cases that have
occurred in the host state and how they have been handled. The Indonesian
government must also include environmental and human rights protections
in its BITs, because Indonesia is at high risk of environmental damages and
119
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human rights abuses when foreign investors invest in mining, manufacturing,
or other sectors that are vulnerable to the exploitation of natural resources or
human rights. In addition, it is also important for the Indonesian government
to reform the field of international arbitration. The existing arbitration law
has potential to cause difficulties concerning the execution of international
arbitration awards conducted beyond and within the Indonesian jurisdiction.
This reform would create greater trust amongst foreign investors to invest in
Indonesia and allow them to resolve any investment disputes in an Indonesian
arbitral tribunal.

109

Tito Bramantyo

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Legal Documents and Cases
Amco Asia Corporation and others v. the Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No.
ARB/81/1, Decision on Request for Provisional Measures, 9 December 1983.
Amco Asia Corporation and Others v. the Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No.
ARB/81/1 Awards on Jurisdiction, 21 November 1984.
Amco Asia Corporation and others v. the Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No.
ARB/81/1, Decision on Annulment, 16 May 1986.
Churchill Mining PLC and Planet Mining Pty Ltd. v. the Republic of Indonesia, ICSID
Case No. ARB/12/14 and ARB/12/40, Award, 6 December 2016.
Hesham Talaat M. Al-Warraq v. the Republic of Indonesia, UNCITRAL, Final Award,
15 December 2004.
Indian Metals & Ferro Alloys Limited (India) v. the Government of the Republic of
Indonesia, PCA Case No. 2015-40, Award, 29 March 2019.
Indonesia. Undang-Undang tentang Penanaman Modal Asing, UU No. 25 Tahun
2007. (Law on the Foreign Investment Law, Law No. 25 Year 2007).
Indonesia. Undang-Undang tentang Penanaman Modal Asing, UU No. 78 Tahun
1958. (Law on the Foreign Investment Law, Law No. 78 Year 1958).
Metal-Tech Ltd. v. the Republic of Uzbekistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/3, Award, 4
October 2013.
Rafat Ali Rizvi v. the Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/13, Award on
Jurisdiction, 16 July 2013.
Rafat Ali Rizvi v. the Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/13, Separate
Concurring Opinion of Professor Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, 16 July 2013.
The Government of the Province of East Kalimantan v. PT Kaltim Prima Coal, Rio
Tinto PLC, BP P.L.C., Pacific Resources Investment Limited, BP International
Limited, Sangatta Holdings Limited, Kalimantan Coal Limited, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/3, Award on Jurisdiction, 28 December 2009.
Journal Article and Periodicals
Adolf, Huala. “Urgensi Pembentukan Undang-Undang tentang Arbitrase Internasional
[The Urgency of Creating International Arbitration National Act].” Fiat Justitia
10, no. 2 (2016): 221-412. DOI: 10.25041/fiatjustisia.v10no2.684.
Bramantya, Saputro. “Di Balik Undang-Undang Cipta Kerja [Behind the Job Creation
Law.” Warta Fiskal 3, no. 1 (2021): 17.
Jailani, Abdulkadir. “Indonesia’s Perspective on Review of International Investment
Agreements.” South Centre: Investment Policy Brief, no. 1 (2015): 1-6.
Petrova, Irina. “Stepping on the Shoulders of a Drowning Man the Doctrine of Abuse
of Right as a Tool for Reducing Damages for Lost Profits: Troubling Lessons from
the Patuha and Himpurna Arbitrations.” Georgetown Journal of International
Law 35, no.2 (2004): 455-485.
Rubin, Noah. “The Enforcement and Annulment of International Arbitration Awards
in Indonesia.” American University International Law Review 20, no.2 (2005):
359-401.
Schultz, Thomas and Cedric Dupont. “Investment Arbitration: Promoting the Rule of
Law or Over-empowering Investors? A Quantitative Empirical Study.” European

110

Indonesian Participation in International Investment Law Reform

Journal of International Law 25, no. 4 (2015): 1147–1168. DOI:10.1093/ejil/
chu075.
Sujayadi. “Interaction between the Setting Aside of an Award and Leave for
Enforcement.” Yuridika 20, no. 2 (2015): 333-351. DOI: 10.20473/ydk.
v30i2.4661.
Vandevelde, Kenneth J. “The Political Economy of a Bilateral Investment Treaty.”
American Journal of International Law 92, no. 4 (1998): 621-641. DOI:
10.2307/2998126.
Books and Book Chapters
De Brabandere, Eric. Investment Treaty Arbitration as Public International Law:
Procedural, Aspects and Implications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2014.
Dolzer, Rudolf and Christoph Schreuer. Principles of International Investment Law,
Second Edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.
Schill, Stephan W. Fair and Equitable Treatment, the Rule of Law, and Comparative
Public Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
Sornarajah, Muthucumaraswamy. The International Law of Foreign Investment,
Fourth Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Sornarajah, Muthucumaraswamy. “Developing countries in the investment treaty
system: A law for need or a law for greed?” In International Investment Law and
Development: Bridging the Gap, edited by Stephan W. Schill, Christian J. Tams
and Rainer Hofmann. 43-68. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015.
Sornarajah, Muthucumaraswamy. “Toward Normlessness: The Ravage and Retreat of
Neo-Liberalism in International Investment Law.” In Yearbook on International
Investment Law & Policy 2009-2010, edited by Karl P. Sauvant. 595-642. New
York: Oxford University Press, 2010.
Speake, Jennifer and Mark LaFlaur, The Oxford Essential Dictionary of Foreign
Terms in English. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
Others
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. “Indonesia 2010
Executive Summary.” OECD Investment Policy Reviews (2010).
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. “Indonesia 2010
Overview of Progress and Policy Challenges.” OECD Investment Policy Reviews
(2010).
Tietje, Christian and Freya Baetens. “The Impact of Investor-State-Dispute Settlement
(ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.” Minister for
Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The
Netherlands (2014).
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. “Denunciation of the ICSID
Convention and BITs: Impact on Investor-State Claims.” UNCTAD IIA Issue
Note, 2010.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. “Expropriation.” UNCTAD
Series on Issues in International Investment Agreement II, 2012.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. “Reform of Investor-State
Dispute Settlement: In Search of a Roadmap.” UNCTAD IIA Issue Note, 2013.

111

